The events of the past few days on Europe’s borders may mark a turning point in Russia’s war on Ukraine. While the political skies in Kyiv have darkened for Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the military picture looks brighter. Ukraine can already send swarms of drones against Russian oil facilities, e-commerce warehouses and airfields. Andy Burnham’s arrival in Kyiv marks a step forward. Britain is releasing classified information on its components of Scalp, the French version of the Anglo-French Storm Shadow cruise missile, enabling its assembly in Ukraine. This is more than another weapon for Kyiv. Britain is helping Ukraine become less dependent on the western armoury.
Moscow sabre-rattles, but Britain should hold its nerve. Kyiv has been at the mercy of its allies, waiting to replenish weapons stockpiles and release sophisticated arms. Producing its own hi-tech armoury gives Ukraine greater freedom of action because western governments have let go. Two years ago it was different. Joe Biden waited until November 2024 before letting Ukraine strike deep into Russia with US weapons. Yet thresholds once deemed dangerously escalatory have since been crossed without provoking a Russia-Nato war. Kyiv is now being trusted with something more consequential: a measure of weapons independence.
It needs this. Ukraine cannot overcome its manpower disadvantage by fighting Russia soldier for soldier for every kilometre of its vital eastern fortress belt, where Kyiv is losing ground. If Moscow can freely push ammunition, drones and equipment towards Donetsk, eventually something will give. Cruise missiles offer another strategy, making it harder and costlier for Russian forces to reach the front. Europe is thinking defensively too. Ukraine relies heavily on the US-made Patriots to down ballistic missiles, but global shortages of interceptors, a situation made worse by the US war with Iran, have left it exposed. With European help, Ukraine’s defence industry is developing an anti-ballistic system intended to reduce that dependence. Kyiv is ramping up its own ballistic missiles. If both are successful, Ukraine would be better able both to strike and defend itself without first appealing to Washington.
War is a terrible thing, but what is the alternative? Moscow offers little evidence that territorial success would satisfy it. Despite enormous casualties and painfully slow advances, Vladimir Putin rejects proposals that fail to meet Russia’s broader conditions while expanding military power rather than preparing his people for compromise. Then there is the rise of the far right in Europe, large parts of which are pro-Russia. If Mr Putin thinks that the outlook for Russia’s position will improve politically over the next two or three years, he will bargain harder. Why accept merely the Donbas today if the coalition supporting Ukraine might be weaker tomorrow? That option disappears if either Russia’s war burden becomes intolerable or the west convincingly insulates its material help from political change.
History offers lessons. In Vladislav M Zubok’s Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin is startled to hear that Ukrainians, including millions of Russian speakers, want independence in 1991. Once convinced this is their democratic will, however, he accepts it. Russia, he says, will “recognise this new political reality”. Mr Putin starts from the same sense of historical intimacy and reaches the opposite conclusion: that Ukraine’s democratic choices cannot override Russia’s claim to a privileged role in its future. That is a revanchist error he ought to regret.
