Since taking office in October 2025, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has been busy reforming Japan’s defense policy. Her government is revising the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program to prepare for an era of heightened instability and growing uncertainty over U.S. engagement in the region. Notably, Tokyo raised defense and other security-related spending to approximately 1.8 percent of GDP in the 2025-2026fiscal year, up from around 1 percent in 2022. In April, Japan also revised its defense transfer policy with the aim of promoting exports of weapons and nonlethal military equipment.
Expanding Japan’s defense production capacity has been a central focus of these reforms. In its budget request for the 2027 fiscal year, the Japanese Defense Ministry singles out domestic military production as a critical element of deterrence. This reflects growing concerns that Japan may need to sustain military operations in a protracted, high-intensity conflict. In an analysis of the U.S.-Israel war against Iran that was published in August, the Defense Ministry explicitly recognizes the need to maintain adequate production capacity in peacetime—and to be ready to rapidly scale up weapons production in the event of a conflict.
Since taking office in October 2025, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has been busy reforming Japan’s defense policy. Her government is revising the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program to prepare for an era of heightened instability and growing uncertainty over U.S. engagement in the region. Notably, Tokyo raised defense and other security-related spending to approximately 1.8 percent of GDP in the 2025-2026fiscal year, up from around 1 percent in 2022. In April, Japan also revised its defense transfer policy with the aim of promoting exports of weapons and nonlethal military equipment.
Expanding Japan’s defense production capacity has been a central focus of these reforms. In its budget request for the 2027 fiscal year, the Japanese Defense Ministry singles out domestic military production as a critical element of deterrence. This reflects growing concerns that Japan may need to sustain military operations in a protracted, high-intensity conflict. In an analysis of the U.S.-Israel war against Iran that was published in August, the Defense Ministry explicitly recognizes the need to maintain adequate production capacity in peacetime—and to be ready to rapidly scale up weapons production in the event of a conflict.
Japan’s focus on production capacity reflects a change in the way that military planners think about deterrence. Russia’s yearslong war against Ukraine and the ongoing conflict in the Middle East have demonstrated the prolonged, high-intensity, resource-draining nature of modern warfare. Some analysts now expect a potential conflict over Taiwan to play out in similar ways, rather than the quick, decisive campaign that many experts had long assumed as their base case.
NATO frames deterrence around three elements: capability (does a state have the weapons to defend itself?), credibility (would it actually use them?), and communication (does the adversary understand what it would be up against?). In a long, high-intensity conflict, each of these three pillars is increasingly shaped by production capacity.
Production capacity affects the availability of the weapons needed for military operations both in preparation during peacetime and during an ongoing war. Recent conflicts have underlined two aspects of replenishment capability: the replacement rate (whether weapons output keeps pace with consumption in the battlespace) and the cost-to-kill ratio (how much a defensive weapon costs compared to the offensive threat that it counters).
In terms of credibility, a longer conflict is not just about the willingness to use force but also the willingness to sustain it for the duration of the conflict. The durability of public and private investment signals whether a state can support production throughout a prolonged conflict.
In terms of communication, an adversary’s calculation—and hence the deterrent effect—is affected by the signal sent by investing political and financial capital in defense production capacity.
Viewed through this framework, recent announcements by the Japanese government and reports on the forthcoming reforms show how production capacity relates to the three pillars of deterrence. To upgrade capability, Tokyo has indicated that it will accelerate support for domestic industry. To this end, the Japanese government is planning to release a new defense industrial base strategy, likely to include new subsidies to support defense firms’ production capacity. One plan is to extend an existing scheme to the acquisition and maintenance of production facilities for ammunition and other critical supplies necessary for sustained combat capability. Through greater governmental support, Tokyo aims to establish spare defense production capacity that could sustain protracted and high-intensity warfare.
To enhance credibility—by demonstrating willingness not just to spend now but also to keep spending in the future—Tokyo is working to bolster the domestic defense investment landscape. Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi has urged Japanese financial institutions to provide investment and loans to grow the domestic defense sector, and lenders are responding.
In May, the Development Bank of Japan, a state-owned institution, eased its restrictions on financing domestic arms manufacturers. Private banks are also increasing their involvement in the sector. MUFG Bank, one of Japan’s largest private-sector banks, is reportedly planning to establish criteria for lending to defense-related companies after having previously been cautious. These measures normalize defense-related investments in peacetime, but they do not guarantee the financial sector’s commitment to invest in case of a longer conflict.
In April, the Defense Ministry stated that Japan must not allow an adversary to believe that prolonging a conflict would ensure the success of an invasion, emphasizing the importance of stockpiling and domestic production. Koizumi has made the connection between defense production and deterrence increasingly explicit. Economy, Trade and Industry Minister Ryosei Akazawa has also been explicit about investing in the industrial base for dual-use goods in order to strengthen Japan’s ability to sustain military operations.
In terms of communicating deterrence, Tokyo is matching these efforts with political signaling that its new defense-industrial posture is a long-term change that’s here to stay.
There are still two major gaps in Japan’s production planning for a potential conflict. First—despite these initiatives—Japan is still struggling to ramp up defense production. According to the Defense Ministry’s assessments, insufficient parts production is likely to continue limiting the operational availability of military equipment, particularly aircraft, for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.
This means that Japan is still struggling to meet peacetime demand, let alone the surge in production that a protracted conflict would require. Tokyo is considering government-owned, contractor-operated facilities as a means to enable rapid defense production increases when needed, but the feasibility and potential scale of such agreements remain unclear. This problem is exacerbated by the absence of a legal framework that would allow the government to compel manufacturers to sustain operations in wartime, raising fundamental questions about Tokyo’s ability to translate expanded capacity into wartime output.
Second, Japan’s defense supply chain remains vulnerable. It is extensive and stretched thin, including around 1,100 manufacturers involved in the production of fighter jets, 1,300 for tanks, and 8,300 for destroyers. Despite Tokyo’s efforts to enhance its defense capability, protecting this extensive network remains challenging. In many cases, it is difficult to find alternative suppliers for specialized component materials or specific manufacturing processes. Consequently, disruption to any part of the supply chain could affect the stable supply and maintenance of equipment.
Strengthening supply-chain resilience, particularly with regard to small and medium suppliers, is crucial to ensuring a stable supply of equipment. Tokyo is considering dispersing, hardening, and placing military facilities underground, but these discussions do not apply to industrial suppliers. Increasing supply-chain redundancy—both domestically and with Japan’s strategic partners—is also critical.
In this respect, the deal with Australia for upgraded Mogami-class frigates, as well as discussions with Indonesia on transferring used Asagiri-class destroyers there, include cooperation on maintenance. Foreign-based maintenance facilities for Japanese-built platforms could, over time, provide additional repair capacity outside Japan.
The revision of Japan’s three national strategic documents and the Defense Industry Policy is expected to be concluded next month. The policies set out in these documents will determine the course of Japan’s defense industrial policy in the years to come. If production capacity in a protracted conflict is now part of Tokyo’s deterrence calculations, then the test for the strategy documents to be released in December will be whether they move beyond only peacetime capacity. This would entail granting the government the authority to direct production during wartime and planning how civilian manufacturers, particularly in dual-use sectors, could contribute to a wartime surge. Alongside these policies, effective strategic communication to shape an adversary’s expectations about the duration and likely outcome of a conflict will be key to strengthening deterrence.


