Early in the Iran war, the Houthis declared that if Iran came under attack, the Red Sea would run “red with the blood of its enemies.” That warning hung in the air for months as the Houthis continued to issue threats of closure without any action. But Tehran picked the moment carefully. As the White House insisted that the Strait of Hormuz remained open—a claim that Tehran denied—Tehran activated the Houthis at Bab el-Mandeb to demonstrate at the second chokepoint what Iran could not settle at the first.
Kicking off events, Tehran flew a sanctioned Iranian aircraft into Yemen’s Sanaa airport in defiance of Saudi inspection mechanisms. Yemen’s internationally recognized government, operating with Saudi coalition air support, cratered the runway to stop the plane. The Houthis, who have complied with the Saudi restrictions for years, found a pretext to retaliate. The series of escalations that followed, from striking Saudi Arabia’s Abha airport to attacking Saudi Aramco facilities, were sufficient to induce global economic panic, as the price of Brent crude closed above $100 a barrel for the first time since the war started.
Early in the Iran war, the Houthis declared that if Iran came under attack, the Red Sea would run “red with the blood of its enemies.” That warning hung in the air for months as the Houthis continued to issue threats of closure without any action. But Tehran picked the moment carefully. As the White House insisted that the Strait of Hormuz remained open—a claim that Tehran denied—Tehran activated the Houthis at Bab el-Mandeb to demonstrate at the second chokepoint what Iran could not settle at the first.
Kicking off events, Tehran flew a sanctioned Iranian aircraft into Yemen’s Sanaa airport in defiance of Saudi inspection mechanisms. Yemen’s internationally recognized government, operating with Saudi coalition air support, cratered the runway to stop the plane. The Houthis, who have complied with the Saudi restrictions for years, found a pretext to retaliate. The series of escalations that followed, from striking Saudi Arabia’s Abha airport to attacking Saudi Aramco facilities, were sufficient to induce global economic panic, as the price of Brent crude closed above $100 a barrel for the first time since the war started.
The intent to activate Bab el-Mandeb as an Iranian front had been telegraphed openly just a week before the Houthi-Saudi escalation. In fact, in a column titled “Close Bab el-Mandeb and See the Result,” Hossein Shariatmadari, former Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s appointee as managing editor of Kayhan, argued that Iran could do the job itself, reaching the strait with its own precision missiles sent from 2,300 kilometers away.
The pressure in the Red Sea was quickly paired with Iraqi militia drone strikes on major Saudi energy facilities in Riyadh and the Eastern Province, completing a unified axis operation designed to squeeze Riyadh from every side while creating a global economic panic.
But while Tehran strategically benefits from projecting its power on another chokepoint, for the Houthis, this escalation raises the stakes in an ongoing battle with Saudi Arabia. Last Thursday, for instance, Houthis attacked a Yemeni government camp and left at least 30 government soldiers dead. It was one of the deadliest days of the conflict so far.
Unlike in 2015, when Riyadh fought its first war in Yemen without experience or a unified Yemeni army, Saudi Arabia has now moved to consolidate power within Yemen and unite factions under one leadership. Through attacking the Southern Transitional Council over the past year, it signaled that it is far less inclined to yield under pressure. The tactical cost of firing drones remains negligible for the Houthis, but the strategic risk is existential.
By letting Tehran dictate the timing of this maritime war, the Houthis risk pushing Saudi Arabia into a total confrontation that could ignite a ground war in Yemen, one that the group may not have sufficient funding or weaponry to sustain.
The latest actions in the Red Sea are the exact playbook that the Houthis have run for a decade. At a fraction of the cost of the interceptors sent to stop them, whether through a cheap drone, an anti-ship missile, or a radio warning that costs nothing at all, the Houthis impose burdens on Riyadh and Washington out of all proportion to their spending. In the process, they stretch U.S. air defenses already committed at Hormuz.
Iranian Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani has said as much, describing a security belt of the resistance running “from the Strait of Hormuz to Bab el-Mandeb.” What the Houthis announced on July 20 was the execution of an Iranian instruction. Just a week before the Houthis announced their closure of the chokepoint, reports emerged that Iran had instructed the Houthis to close the route if Washington struck its power infrastructure—meaning that their missiles and drones were already in position.
Tellingly, and in contrast to Tehran’s operational bluster, much of the coverage in Houthi media frames this as an economic war and not a military one. What the movement figured out over years of conflict is that durable pressure comes from the ability to issue a threat rather than the need to execute one, which is why the July blockade announcement ran on radio and via email. Houthi outlets are now claiming that underwriters are dropping Saudi-linked vessels altogether. Whether true or not, reporting it serves the primary objective of forcing markets to price in the threat ahead of time.
Writing in al-Ahed, the Hezbollah-aligned analyst Jihad Haidar argued that the real test of U.S. military power is not how many warships are deployed or strikes are flown, but whether shippers will transit and underwriters will take on the risk. As long as insurance markets refuse the coverage, total military superiority counts for nothing.
The Houthis are careful to keep their public claims justifying their actions local. They lean heavily on grievances from the civil war in Yemen, targeting Riyadh to squeeze out specific concessions such as public salary payments, open ports, and expanded flight access from the Sanaa airport. Meanwhile, not a single Houthi statement connects the movement’s attacks on Saudi Arabia to Hormuz or the wider war with the United States.
Framing their actions strictly around civil war grievances serves two calculated purposes for the Houthis. First, by keeping the focus on Saudi Arabia, they honor the May 2025 Oman-brokered cease-fire with Washington. This is an attempt to shield themselves from direct U.S. military retaliation while still pressing their advantage at sea. Second, keeping their demands tied to salaries, ports, and flights allows the movement to decouple its local economic extortion from Tehran’s wider regional war, forcing Riyadh into an isolated bilateral deal.
Keeping a diplomatic door open to Riyadh is central to the Houthis’ strategy. They offer Saudi Arabia the prospect of a bilateral exit, but Riyadh alone cannot grant what the movement demands, since Yemen’s government would also need to sign off.
And there, the trap becomes clear. Granting the Houthis’ demands outside a real negotiated peace deal forces the government to finance without oversight what could be Houthi loyalists and militia on a public payroll. Concessions granted under such circumstances would not wind the civil war down but would fund the Houthis, rearm them, and harden their military grip.
As the Houthis and Tehran press their advantage, Saudi Arabia—which has invested heavily in detente in the past three years; opposed the U.S. intervention on Iran; and continued to offer diplomatic gestures, including flying a delegation to Khamenei’s funeral—finds itself facing bad-faith actors. At this point, it is trapped in what looks like a classic protection racket.
The Houthis themselves are running out of options. Outside of areas that they control in Yemen, few are willing to accept a peace agreement that pardons the movement. Moreover, tensions with northern tribal groups have only worsened as Houthi authorities press harder on local taxation and forced recruitment drives. And the group continues to isolate itself diplomatically—the recent arrests of aid workers on espionage charges pushed major relief organizations out of its areas altogether.
Whatever political appeal the group once held has faded; loyalty is increasingly driven by conscription and fear. No wonder they are so willing to raise the stakes with Riyadh.
As for Tehran, none of this domestic pressure alters its calculus. Iranian strategy is focused on applying leverage wherever possible, and in this case, before American election pressures force a change in U.S. posture.
On July 24, the Iranian daily Javan published a column titled “Do Not Sell Time to Trump,” arguing that time is itself an instrument of power for Tehran. The author urged Iran to exploit U.S. President Donald Trump’s current vulnerability now rather than bank it until after the U.S. midterms. After November, the author argued, the pressures working in Tehran’s favor, including high energy prices, market turbulence, and U.S. military casualties, will likely ease, leaving Trump far less constrained. Reading the U.S. political environment, Iranian analysts contend that the leverage created by rising energy prices must be spent now or lost entirely. Thanks to the Houthis, part of that leverage is now on display in the Red Sea.
By maintaining pressure on shipping through Bab el-Mandeb and keeping energy markets on edge, Iran fuels political friction in Washington while leaving Persian Gulf and European partners to absorb the broader economic fallout. Better yet, with the increasing threat to the United States’ partners and pressure on shipping companies in Bab el-Mandeb, Tehran manages to keep energy costs inflated during an election cycle.
Few in the United States appreciate how directly domestic political friction on Capitol Hill reverberates into regional conflicts, or how easily an election-year debate over war powers gets weaponized in Yemen. American election cycles come and go, and they do not resolve the consequences of the U.S. intervention or the fallout in Yemen, nor do they offer Riyadh an exit from a fight that it never chose.
Iran’s proxy network stays functional, and the Houthis remain entrenched and funded at Saudi expense, while the cost to Iran stays negligible, and whichever way Washington turns after November, Saudi Arabia is left absorbing the fallout long after U.S. attention has moved on. That, by itself, is one of Tehran’s achievements: finding a way to make a confrontation with the United States someone else’s problem to pay for, indefinitely.
