AI security company Zenity has disclosed the details of two AI browser hacking techniques targeting Claude in Chrome and ChatGPT Atlas, demonstrating how they can be used for account takeovers, phishing, and making unauthorized Amazon purchases.
Zenity described its research in two separate blog posts published on Wednesday, one covering the ChatGPT Atlas research and one covering the Claude in Chrome attack.
ChatGPT Atlas hacking
Zenity researchers discovered that OpenAI’s agentic browser, ChatGPT Atlas, is vulnerable to zero-click indirect prompt injection (IPI) due to fundamental architectural design issues rather than traditional software bugs.
By exploiting ‘intent collision’ through a single planted comment on an X thread, researchers demonstrated how an attacker can hijack benign user requests to control the agent across authenticated web sessions.
Agentic browsers such as Atlas break Same-Origin Policy (SOP) by design because they act as a single entity spanning multiple authenticated tabs simultaneously, effectively resurrecting cross-site request forgery (CSRF). This enables malicious instructions on an untrusted page to instruct the agent to execute actions across any other site where the user is currently logged in.
Zenity researchers demonstrated two scenarios. In one, a user asks Atlas to perform a routine task, such as signing them up for a newsletter from an X post. A specially crafted X comment redirects Atlas to a malicious payload page. The agent then navigates to WhatsApp Web, reads the victim’s contact list, and sends phishing messages to every contact.
In the second scenario, Atlas is steered to Amazon, adds items to a cart, and updates the shipping address to the attacker’s location. To bypass restrictions that prevent it from clicking the final purchase button, Atlas instructs Amazon’s built-in AI assistant Rufus to place the order instead.
Zenity disclosed these findings to OpenAI in January 2026 and the AI giant acknowledged the report, but there is no easy patch because the exploit relies on the intentional core capability of an agentic browser: reading web content and acting upon it across authenticated domains.
Claude in Chrome hacking
Zenity also demonstrated a zero-click attack chain against the official Claude Chrome extension, escalating an indirect prompt injection into full account takeover across multiple web platforms.
The exploit abuses the agentic browser’s elevated permissions operating within active user sessions.
In one attack scenario described by the security firm, a victim receives a malicious email containing invisible prompt structures. Simply asking Claude to summarize the latest emails forces the agent to interpret the hidden instructions as direct commands.
Standard safety mechanisms should block direct malicious script execution, but attackers can bypass this by hosting custom NPM packages on a rogue CDN. Claude is tricked into calling a benign-looking import, which silently executes payload code.
The researchers demonstrated how, operating within active session cookies, the attacker’s script queries Gmail’s Atom feed, extracts message IDs, parses full email bodies, and silently exfiltrates inbox contents to the attacker server. The attacker can also silently share every file in the targeted user’s Google Drive account with an account they control.
Zenity also demonstrated account takeover against Slack and X accounts. The attacker can trigger an account sign-in or password reset and have the agent monitor Gmail for incoming verification codes, which are then relayed to the attacker for completing the session hijacking.
The findings were reported to Anthropic in December 2025 and January 2026, and were classified as ‘informative’.
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