JOHANNESBURG—The international order is fragmenting just as cracks are widening in countries’ prevailing development model, and as climate and debt crises are leaving governments with less room to maneuver. Despite this, multilateral institutions continue to steer African countries toward the same old destination: a formal economy grounded in industrial employment, with steadily rising GDP supported by technology transfer from foreign partners.
But that destination was never neutral or universally available. Advanced economies’ wealth was built on slavery and colonial extraction: the appropriation of land, labor, and resources. The digital and green transitions, which require African minerals, data, and labor, risk reproducing this dynamic and deepening inequality. Already between 2000 and 2024, the richest 1% globally captured 41% of all new wealth, while the bottom half of humanity gained just 1%.
Africa cannot escape its development challenges by applying the same knowledge, economic, and innovation systems that helped create them. Reform risks reproducing the inequalities that we claim to oppose. Closing the gap between the economies our institutions were designed to manage and the realities they now confront will require three fundamental intellectual ruptures, with multilateral development banks, donor agencies, NGOs, and African governments abandoning outdated assumptions and enabling societies to realize pathways suited to their specific and varied needs.
The first rupture concerns what counts as economic and innovative value. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 87.6% of workers are informally employed—often without security, protection, or policy recognition—usually combining wage work with trading, farming, care, platform gigs, remittances, and community enterprise. These economic arrangements are not temporary. They are durable ways of surviving and creating value, and they cannot be easily absorbed by a modern formal economy.
Development institutions, however, continue to treat formal firms and salaried workers as the norm. Requirements such as formal registration, tax compliance, and conventional collateral frequently determine who can access public procurement, development finance, and business support. Instead of simplistically seeking to “formalize” people into institutions that were designed without them in mind, policymakers should extend protection without erasing hybridity; recognize cooperative, communal, and informal production; and consider not just whether innovation generates growth, but also who owns it, who benefits, and who bears its risks.
The second rupture pertains to knowledge and authority. Development institutions must recognize African organizing logics: the relational ways in which people on the continent already produce knowledge, coordinate resources, and exercise authority. Innovation has never been confined to multinationals, laboratories, universities, and ministries. It also emerges through apprenticeship, communal stewardship, repair cultures, civic tech groups, informal production networks, and distributed governance systems, as well as in urban agglomerations and encounters between Indigenous and scientific knowledge. Yet finance and decision-making remain concentrated in central governments and elite institutions.
Development institutions must recognize marginalized actors as knowledge producers and share resources and authority accordingly, rather than merely inviting them into established, imposed programs. That means financing community and informal innovators directly, supporting intermediaries who can work across different knowledge systems, and preserving locally generated knowledge.
Sudan’s Emergency Response Rooms have organized food distribution, health services, and local relief in war zones, illustrating how capacity can reside in networks that state-centered frameworks view as temporary or unreliable. Community philanthropy networks in Kenya and South Africa show how external finance can reinforce local institutions, as opposed to imposing projects designed elsewhere. Policymakers must learn to see relationships—not just firms or industries—as sites of knowledge and value. These networks effectively combine trust, knowledge, and care in ways that conventional institutional categories often miss.
The third rupture concerns how development institutions act under uncertainty. They must move beyond “solutionism”—the search for easy, ready-made answers—and learn when to experiment and when to pursue “institutional hospicing,” whereby ineffective or harmful systems are paused or shut down. Climate change, AI, demographic shifts, and geopolitical tensions have exposed the fiction of a reliable economic path from “developing” to “developed” status, if one ever existed. Yet governments continue to be rewarded for importing best practices and punished when experimentation fails.
Consider the rush to build AI hyperscaler data centers, whose benefits are treated as self-evident even as they accrue elsewhere, and whose potentially harmful effects—including higher electricity bills, water stress, and pollution—will be borne by local communities. Responsible governance means questioning, delaying, or rejecting projects whose public value has not been demonstrated.
At the same time, multilateral organizations should not shy away from financing experiments whose outcomes cannot be guaranteed in advance. Doing so responsibly will require the participation of affected communities, transparent safeguards, and multiple opportunities to revise or stop these projects. Moreover, their success must be judged not only by GDP growth and patent counts, but also by whether they strengthen adaptive capacity and distribute the benefits and risks of innovation more fairly.
None of this is to suggest that we should romanticize informality, abandon industrial policy, or treat every local practice as inherently just. Rather, the global institutions that define and finance development, and African governments themselves, must make the economies people actually inhabit—and the alternatives emerging within them—visible, contestable, and governable.
The real test of global-governance reform is not only whether African countries gain greater voice within existing institutions, but whether those institutions can respond to Africa’s many different realities and create space for alternative models. Such a governance architecture rests on these three ruptures: reconsidering sources of value, redistributing authority, and learning when to experiment—and when to let go.


