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The writer is director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin
Russia’s war in Ukraine has entered a new escalation phase, with dangerous spillover effects far beyond Europe. One of the most pressing risks is a global grain supply crisis resulting from a fresh spate of Russian and Ukrainian attacks on each other’s agricultural exports. Reversing this potentially disastrous aspect of the conflict could be more realistic at this point than trying to end the war altogether. But it is only possible if the international community chooses to engage.
At this stage of the conflict, Ukraine has largely stabilised the 1,250km combat line and expanded its long-range strikes. But since July, Kyiv has been focusing on a new set of targets: Russian vessels exporting agricultural goods via the Black Sea, as well as the supporting rail and port infrastructure in the Azov Sea. Last week, Ukraine hit all three grain terminals in the port of Novorossiysk that ship more than 40 per cent of Russian grain exports. The authorities have paused exports until repairs are completed.
Russia, too, has intensified its missile barrages against Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea, and even sunk several ships destined for the largest port in Odesa. As a result, both countries’ agricultural exports risk being significantly curtailed or even halted altogether.
Given the importance of both Russia and Ukraine for global food markets, this is deeply concerning. Take, for example, wheat. Moscow and Kyiv together control 27 per cent of global exports, with the bulk of it transported via the Black Sea. Russia and Ukraine are the dominant suppliers to many countries in the Middle East and north Africa.
This season has already been extremely difficult for wheat producers: prices for fuel and fertilisers are up due to the war in the Gulf, while recurrent heatwaves have affected European and American production. Wheat prices are over 25 per cent higher than in 2025, and still growing. The UN forecasts that about 50mn people will be pushed into acute food insecurity later this year because of climate factors alone. If Russian and Ukrainian wheat does not reach the market, that may mean an even greater food security crisis is on the horizon.
While the effects of the heatwaves cannot be addressed quickly, the disruption of food logistics in the Black Sea could be. At the beginning of the Ukraine war, multiple stakeholders pressured Moscow into a grain deal with Kyiv that allowed the free passage of Ukrainian grain. Even after the deal was eventually abandoned, Russia and Ukraine did not undertake a systematic effort to interdict agricultural exports — until this summer.
The international community should now pressure both sides to restore this unspoken agreement. Ultimately, the military upsides of these attacks are marginal, while the potential downsides are immense for a number of countries around the world.
The level of pain that Russia and Ukraine are inflicting upon one another by going after agricultural exports is not critical enough for either to sue for peace. The Kremlin pocketed $41bn from agricultural exports in 2025 — less than 10 per cent of overall export revenues. For Ukraine, on the other hand, agricultural exports account for nearly half of its proceeds, and its ability to redirect grain cargo to ports on the Danube River is limited this year because of the heatwave and low water levels. But as Kyiv is most certain to get another financial lifeline from Europe, the Kremlin’s interdiction of grain shipping won’t deprive Ukraine of its ability to pay for defence.
There are a number of countries with a direct interest in restoring Russian and Ukrainian food exports. First, there are those in the Middle East and Africa — Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for example — who would be most severely affected by a grain crisis and have plenty of channels to and leverage over both Moscow and Kyiv. Then there are Asian giants like China and India, who are large buyers of Russian oil while being dependent on Russian and Ukrainian food exports. Finally, there is Europe, which doesn’t want to see an increased inflow of migrants resulting from a potential food crisis. There is also the US — back in 2022, Washington was instrumental in orchestrating the Black Sea grain deal — but who knows whether Donald Trump’s team is paying attention.
It is not too late to set up an international contact group and design a set of carrots and sticks for Moscow and Kyiv to restore the free passage of agricultural goods. While it is unlikely that the war in Ukraine will be over soon, using diplomacy to contain the most dangerous aspects of the conflict is helpful in itself — and could pave the way for broader de-escalation in the future.
