POLITICO offered Albanese the opportunity to describe his version of the exchange. “We don’t discuss private conversations,” said a spokesperson for the prime minister.
The essence of Keating’s briefing was that Albanese had to break free from the mantra of “stabilization,” which, in its assumption of perpetual Australian frailty in the face of Beijing, Keating believed to be a straitjacket on improving the relationship.
Keating’s key points were that Australia and China had no historical conflicts, which brought with it a responsibility to work together and find common problems; that moving from “stabilization” to “engagement” means greater foreign investment by China into Australia; that Canberra should back China’s membership of the upgraded Trans-Pacific Partnership; that the two countries establish a joint commission on energy and climate cooperation; and that Albanese tell the Chinese Australia will not “automatically dovetail in with the U.S. in the event of a war over Taiwan.”
Keating told Albanese he did not think the Australian people will support involvement in any conflict. The point, Keating said as he left the meeting that day, was that Australia was at a pivotal moment.
“Thirty years ago,” he told Albanese, “the Americans could have their aircraft carriers off the Chinese coast and we could deal with both the U.S. and China. [former Prime Minister John] Howard could. I could. But we have reached a fork in the road.”
Albanese reported to Keating on his return from China that Xi had offered significant goodwill, leading Keating to reply by text that China’s “gravitational pull is only going to get stronger.”
Keating said he was trying to edge a cautious Albanese closer to a new arrangement with China, irrespective of what Washington might think about it.
Keating reinforced this message ahead of the prime minister’s meeting with Trump in Washington in Oct. 2025.
