Countries around the world employ a variety of strategies to navigate the Trump White House. Some try flattery and appeasement. Others keep a low profile. Spain has chosen a path of frank disagreement. Under Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, Madrid has refused to follow Washington’s call for NATO members to increase defense spending to 5 percent of GDP and has rejected President Donald Trump’s request to use Spanish bases in the war with Iran. On issue after issue, from immigration to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, Spain’s left-wing government has publicly forged a path that runs counter to a global trend of right-wing policies.
But now Sánchez’s government faces elections in November, and Spaniards will decide whether the country’s foreign and domestic policy is something they see as reasonable. I spoke with Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares on the latest episode of FP Live to find out how Madrid thinks about the trade-offs in following its progressive agenda while risking the ire of the world’s biggest economy. The full interview is available on the video box atop this page or on the FP Live podcast on Spotify, YouTube, or Apple. What follows here is a lightly edited and condensed transcript.
Ravi Agrawal: Let’s start with relations between Madrid and Washington. In July, U.S. President Donald Trump called Spain a “wasted cause” and a “terrible partner” in NATO. He threatened to cut off trade. In September, he predicted that “Spain will be a ruined country.” So I have to ask you, is the relationship between Madrid and Washington broken?
José Manuel Albares: The relationship is fluid. We see this at all levels. I have contact with U.S. Secretary of State [Marco] Rubio. I’ve met with him on different occasions—in NATO ministerials, for instance—and I’ve had different conversations with him at the ambassador and embassy level, both here in Madrid and in Washington, and everything goes well. Above all, people to people, the reality of the relationship between the two countries is really good.
The United States is the historical and natural ally of Spain and of Europe. Spain is one of the few countries with which the United States has a surplus in trade. The same is true when we look at investment. We are great investors in the United States, and the United States is a great investor here in Spain. We are one of the main buyers of liquefied natural gas [LNG] from the United States. In Spain, we have two military bases—of Spanish sovereignty but used also by the United States—that are key to trans-Atlantic security. If you look at the exchange of students, businessmen, and tourism between Spain and the United States, you see the depth of our relationship.
RA: But I think the Trump administration will point out that Spain has not helped the United States, for example, in the war in Iran, by withholding its bases from U.S. use. This is a fairly transactional administration. If they were to ask, “What good is the Spanish alliance to the United States?” what would you say?
JMA: Two military bases with no cost for decades that are essential for trans-Atlantic security and therefore for the security of the United States; a surplus in trade; a lot of Spanish investment, buying a lot of U.S. LNG; and all of the cultural and educational exchange that we have—all of this is the reality of our relationship, and I would say that is positive for both Spaniards and Americans. If you look at trade, for instance, the relationship is even more positive for the United States than it is for Spain.
RA: Especially by Trump’s calculations, given that he likes an American surplus.
But I have to say, many European governments have chosen to manage their relationship with President Trump quietly. They often turn to flattery or grand displays or gifts. Spain is quite alone in being as outspoken as it is, especially in Europe. I can see that it is electorally beneficial, but there are also costs in the form of having a fairly powerful enemy. For example, last year at a White House Ukraine summit, it was notable that Spain was not represented. You lose something by not being at the table. So I’m curious, how do you weigh the trade-offs of Spain’s stance, specifically with the Trump administration?
JMA: We have a coherent foreign policy that stands for the same values and objectives everywhere in the world, whether in Ukraine or the Middle East. We believe in international law. We believe that war shouldn’t be a tool used to achieve foreign-policy objectives. We believe in the principles of the U.N. Charter, in the protection of civilians. That’s how we conduct ourselves in the world and in foreign affairs, and nothing about what we do diminishes our friendships and alliances. We continue participating in NATO and a very strong trans-Atlantic bond for both security and trade.
When it comes to the different crises going on around the world, Spain is always a decisive actor. In Ukraine, we have been backing the government of President Volodymyr Zelensky and the sovereignty of Ukraine since the very beginning of the war. We support the European project and efforts to make it strong. In the Middle East, we’re trying to push forward the two-state solution, which we know is the only solution that will bring peace and stability to everyone in the Middle East but especially to Israelis and Palestinians. Today, Spain not only has a coherent foreign policy with its own voice but is also recognized and welcomed by all countries in the world.
RA: But even supporters of your policies, while agreeing with much of what you’re saying, will point out that the one thing that sticks out is that Spain has refused to join the calls to spend 5 percent of its GDP on defense. I’m curious how you explain that because on the face of it, one of the easiest things to do that would be coherent would be to join these other European countries that are trying to defend Ukraine from Russia while ensuring that Moscow in the future wouldn’t try to attack other NATO states.
JMA: Two things: Spain has delivered all the capabilities that have been requested by the organization, and we are already spending 2 percent. I wish all the allies could say that. So the day all the allies are at 2 percent of expenditure—which is not the case—the day all the allies have delivered the capabilities that are requested by NATO—
RA: But they’re committing to 3.5 percent—
JMA: One thing is words. Another thing is the facts.
And the second thing: What’s the real commitment? The real commitment is the capabilities, the deployment of troops. We are deploying a historical amount of troops. Three thousand Spanish soldiers are on the eastern front, in Estonia, Slovakia, and Romania. We have troops, we have airplanes, we had ships when they were requested. We are commanding the NATO mission in Iraq and many others under the EU and U.N. flag. At the same time, we have been backing Ukraine since the very beginning of the war of aggression.
When it comes to trans-Atlantic security, Spain is always in the forefront. And the way we view things is more than talking about a percentage. We look at the threats, we decide what capabilities are needed to meet those threats, and then we quantify them.
RA: Well, I’ll just point out that they [NATO members] have committed to 3.5 percent in spending and another 1.5 in infrastructure. Assuming they eventually reach that point in a few years, Spain will be behind that trend line. You can agree or disagree with whether that’s a good thing, but it will make for slightly tougher relations, I think, with the rest of NATO. And I do wonder how you marry that with the idea of a standing army for Europe, which you’ve called for—a common EU force. Do you see that as something that is diminishing NATO?
JMA: Certainly, we will not diminish NATO. NATO remains the key organization for trans-Atlantic security, and I’ve always been very clear that I really believe in the trans-Atlantic bond for security and for trade. But we have to accept that the U.S. administration is inviting us to take deterrence and security in our own hands. We have to do it, and we have to accept that we have threats that are very pressing right now in Europe.
Therefore, we need to advance our common European defense. The idea isn’t new; it has been there since the very beginning of European projects—the objective of having a European army that will not substitute the national army but if the scope of the threat is European, it will deter at the European level. It will be part of the European pillar of NATO, not against NATO, in the same way that having a strong American army doesn’t diminish NATO but reinforces NATO. Having a strong, common European defense will never diminish NATO or weaken NATO. It will make it stronger.
RA: I’m lingering on your words where you said the United States is inviting Spain and Europe to take security in your own hands. When I add to this the fact that in April, you went with Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez to Beijing and signed 19 agreements, I’m curious if Spain is hedging toward China—and more broadly, are you derisking from the United States?
JMA: We don’t have to mix things. Most of the European presidents go to China. President Trump invited President Xi Jinping to Washington, and no one thought that they were changing one relationship for the other. The United States is an ally. We are a very solid partner in the European project, but we talk to the main actors in the world. It’s impossible to have a global foreign policy without having a dialogue with China, just like President Trump and all the European presidents do. We are talking about a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, a great power, whether you look at it economically, demographically, or militarily.
At the same time, we have a huge trade deficit with China, the highest that we have in the world, and we have to really balance that. So we need to make a balance in that trade deficit, and we ask China to allow our companies to go into China in the same way that they come to Europe when it comes to public procurement or technological transfer. But we are committed, above all, to European construction and also to the trans-Atlantic bond, which is where Spain stands very firmly.
RA: I’m going to turn now to the Middle East. Your government has also been quite outspoken on Gaza, another area of stark difference with the Trump administration. You’ve called what is happening there a genocide. You’ve imposed an arms embargo and banned imports from settlements. Spanish-Israeli diplomatic relations were downgraded. The Spanish ambassador to Israel was permanently recalled. Yours is a relatively lonely stance in Europe. Tell me, what do you realistically hope to accomplish with your approach to Israel?
JMA: We are not alone in Europe. We started a movement of recognition of the state of Palestine that was followed by many countries today. More countries in Europe recognize the state of Palestine than not. And when we meet in the European Council, we continue to back the two-state solution every year. That’s where our policy is. It’s a policy that believes in peace and peaceful coexistence. And we think that the only solution that will guarantee peace and security for everyone in the Middle East—but also for the Israeli people because none of what we do or say goes against the state of Israel—is the two-state solution. A state of Palestine, guaranteeing mutual security and prosperity and living in a good neighborhood with the state of Israel. Of course, Israel has a right to have a state of security, prosperity, and peace, but the Palestinian people have the same right to the same type of state.
RA: Minister, all of that sounds good, but do you see that as realistic anymore given what the Trump administration is doing and moving ahead with on the Board of Peace?
JMA: It’s the only realistic possibility. The other one is accepting that for some reason, the people in the Middle East—especially Israelis and Palestinians but all of them—only have one way to relate to each other: through violence and war. For me, that’s unacceptable. They are not different from us. They don’t wish, for them and for their children, different things than we do.
In Europe, we spent centuries waging war on our neighbors. The border was a real curse: Having a border meant that the other side of the border was where your enemy was. Then we went for the European Union, which showed that we could transform the border into a symbol of cooperation and that the people on the other side of that border were the people with which you were going to do everything to achieve peace and prosperity. Why couldn’t the Middle East be the same?
RA: They say that foreign policy begins at home. Your country’s heading into elections in November. Given everything we’ve been discussing about the Middle East, about international law, about Ukraine and defense spending, and relations with the United States, how do you explain why your foreign-policy decisions matter to the Spanish people?
JMA: The Spanish people realize that today, no country in the world, not even the most powerful one, can take all the decisions internally, within the government or in our parliaments. They realize that we need to work and cooperate with others and that there are decisions that are taken in Brussels at the EU level, and in New York at the U.N., that have a direct impact on their well-being.
When we see war in Ukraine, it’s not only about Ukraine; it has an impact on us. What happens in Hormuz has an impact on the pockets of Spaniards. If we don’t stop climate change, it will have an impact even in their lifetimes—we see it more and more with fires and peaks of heat during the summers that cause the deaths of many people. So, for all those reasons, they realize that to have well-being internally—in Spain or in any country—the government has to perform well in foreign policy. It’s important because in the end, foreign policy is about defending the interest of your citizens and of projecting their values.
